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Case law in Montana does not accurately reflect the extent of
activity which has been generated by the adoption of the Montana
Administration Procedure Act (hereinafter MAPA or the Act).'
Adopted in 1971,2 the Act has had a tremendous impact on nearly
every state agency. The Act's definition of "agency"' is very broad
and encompasses hundreds of governmental entities. Only four cat-
egories of state activity are excepted.'
Despite the extensive impact, the Montana Supreme Court has
reviewed only four administrative law cases during the period be-
tween September, 1977, and September, 1978. There are a number
of reasons for the limited number of cases. The first is the complex-
ity of agency procedures. The procedures prescribed by MAPA
usually involve numerous quasi-judicial steps5 before an issue is
1. MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as MCA] § 2-4-101 to 711 (1978)
(formerly codified at REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 19471,
§§ 84-4201 to 4229 (Supp. 1977)).
2. The Act became effective December 31, 1972.
3. MCA § 2-4-102(1) (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947,'§ 82-4202(1) (Supp.
1977)) cross-references the definition of "agency" to MCA § 2-3-102 (1978) (formerly codified
at R.C.M. 1947, § 82-4227 (Supp. 1977)). That section provides:
(1) "agency" means any board, bureau, commission, department, authority, or
officer of the state or local government authorized by law to make rules, determine
contested cases, or enter into contracts except:
(a) the legislature and any branch, committee or officer thereof;
(b) the judicial branches and any committee or officer thereof;
(c) the governor, except that an agency is not exempt because the gover-
nor has been designated as a member thereof; or
(d) the state military establishment and agencies concerned with civil
defense and recovery from hostile attack.
4. In addition to exempting the above entities from its operation, MCA § 2-4-102(1)
(1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 82-4202 (Supp. 1977)) excludes the following:
(a) the state board of pardons, except that the board shall be subject to the require-
ments of 2-4-103, 2-4-201, 2-4-202, and 2-4-306 and its rules shall be published in
the Montana administrative code and register;
(b) the supervision and administration of any penal institution with regard to the
institutional supervision, custody, control, care, or treatment of youths or prisoners;
(c) the board of regents and the Montana university system;
(d) the financing, construction, and maintenance of public works.
5. In a typical'case, quasi-judicial steps may include hearing before an appointed hear-
ing officer, rehearing, appeal of the hearing officer's decision to the department, rehearing,
appeal of the department's decision to a supervisory board or commission, and rehearing at
that level. There has been no case holding that rehearings must be sought as part of the
available administrative remedies; they are regarded as an option for aggrieved persons.
Nevertheless, at least three steps are usually required before the matter is ripe for judicial
review. The Montana Administrative Procedure Act does, however, provide an avenue of
relief from intermediate agency action. Where review of a final agency decision would not
1
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presented to the district court for review. The time involved and
expenses incurred by a private party who believes that he or she has
been aggrieved by an agency decision can be burdensome. A protes-
tant may become intimidated and exhausted by the complicated
procedures involved in stopping, compelling or altering agency ac-
tion. Consequently, there is a tendency simply to give up before a
final adjudication by the supreme. court.
Secondly, the time-honored rule that all administrative reme-
dies must be exhauated before seeking relief in the courts prevents
immediate judicial resolution of disputes. The Act contains a codifi-
cation of this rule7 and the supreme court has recognized this re-
quirement in a post-MAPA case.8 Neither the district court nor the
supreme court has jurisdiction to review an administrative decision
until a protestant has pursued every available remedy provided by
the agency pursuant to MAPA's directives.
The third and primary reason that the number of cases does not
correspond to the extent of administrative activity is the limitation
imposed by the Act which prevents judicial review of some adminis-
trative actions. Only "final decisions"' in "contested cases"' 0 are
reviewable. The scope of review does not include daily informal
decisions, which are estimated to constitute ninety percent of
agency actions." The reviewing court sits without a jury and its
inquiry is confined to the record, with certain exceptions. i2 The
court's options with respect to the disposition of a matter are also
limited. It may affirm an agency's decision or remand for further
provide an adequate remedy, intermediate agency action is immediately reviewable. MCA §
2-4-701 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 82-4216 (part)(Supp. 1977)).
6. After a determination by the district court on a petition for judicial review, an appeal
may be taken to the supreme court as in civil cases. MCA § 2-4-711 (1978) (formerly codified
at R.C.M. 1947, § 82-4217 (Supp. 1977)).
7. MCA § 2-4-702 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 82-4216 (Supp. 1977)).
8. State of Montana ex rel. Jones v. Giles, 168 Mont. 130, 132, 541 P.2d 355, 357 (1975).
9. "Final decision" usually means an ultimate determination of the merits of an ag-
grieved person's case made at the highest possible level of the administrative hierarchy.
10. A "contested case" is defined at MCA § 2-4-102(4) (1978) (formerly codified at
R.C.M. 1947, § 82-4202(3) (Supp. 1977)) and means "any proceeding before an agency in
which a determination of legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party is required by law to be
made after an opportunity for a hearing."
11. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 88 (1972).
12. The parties may, by stipulation, agree to shorten the record. MCA § 2-4-702(4)
(1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 82-4216(4) (Supp. 1977)). The district court
may, upon application of a party, allow additional evidence to be presented if the evidence
is shown to the court's satisfaction to be material and good reasons for failure to present it
are given. The court may hear the evidence or may remand to the agency for additional
proceedings. MCA § 2-4-702 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 82-4216(5) (Supp.
1977)). Proof may be taken in court of alleged irregularities in procedure at the administrative
level and the court may allow the parties to submit briefs and make oral arguments. MCA §
2-4-704(1) (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 82-4216(6) (Supp. 1977)).
1979]
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proceedings; it may reverse or modify only if "substantial rights of
the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative find-
ings, inferences, conclusions or decisions" are tainted by specific
errors. 
3
These limitations are directed only to the district court; the Act
does not specify what the role of the supreme court is when a district
court's decision is appealed. Although the supreme court has not
stated its perception of its role in review of administrative decisions
in any case decided since MAPA was adopted, an early administra-
tive law case describes its function as that of a "watchdog" of ad-
ministrative agencies. 4 The supreme court seems to have incorpo-
rated the Act's limitations on district court review in its own treat-
ment of administrative cases. In Vita-Rich Dairy, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Business Regulation, " the court stated the reasons for lim-
ited judicial review: (1) limited judicial review of administrative
decisions strengthens the administrative process by encouraging the
full presentation of evidence at the initial administrative hearing;
(2) judicial economy requires court recognition of the expertise of
administrative agencies in the field of their responsibility; and (3)
limited judicial review is necessary to determine that a fair proce-
dure was used, that questions of law were properly decided, and that
the decision of the administrative body was supported by substan-
tial evidence.'" Although the court did not directly adopt this state-
ment as a definition of its own role, its enunciation of these policy
reasons for limited judicial review may provide a key to the court's
consideration of future administrative law cases.
This survey, then, analyzes four cases in the context of the
policy statement of Vita-Rich Dairy.
I. Western Bank of Billings v. Banking Board'7
Rimrock Bank of Billings filed application with the Montana
13. MCA § 2-4-704(2) (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 82-4216(7) (Supp.
1977)) provides that the court may reverse or modify the decision only if:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) affected by other error of law;
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on
the whole record;
(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwar-
ranted exercise of discretion;
(g) because findings of fact, upon issues essential to the decision were not made
although requested.
14. Peterson v. Livestock Commission, 120 Mont. 140, 149, 181 P.2d 152, 157 (1947).
15. 170 Mont. 341, 553 P.2d 980 (1976).
16. Id. at 344-45, 553 P.2d at 982-83.
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Banking Board for a certificate of authorization. At the required
hearing, Western Bank appeared in opposition to the application
and filed a motion to deny the application as insufficient as a matter
of law or, alternatively, to grant the applicant sixty days to cure
deficiencies. The extra time would have allowed Western Bank to
complete further discovery. After denying the motion, the board
granted the application. Its decision was affirmed by the district
court. On appeal to the supreme court, the court consolidated nine
issues which were raised as error into three principal questions.
The first issue concerned the sufficiency of Rimrock's applica-
tion. Western Bank contended that, because of an alleged defi-
ciency, the board should not have conducted the hearing. After
considering Western Bank's objections, the board allowed the hear-
ing to continue after ruling that the deficiency in the application
was insubstantial. 8
The Montana Supreme Court agreed with the board's decision:
"Western's contention is tantamount to saying that the slightest
defect in the application at the time of the administrative hearing,
[sic] deprives the board of jurisdiction to proceed with the hear-
ing."' The court reasoned that "applications in administrative pro-
ceedings are roughly analogous to pleadings in civil actions" and
held that "[pileadings and applications in an administrative mat-
ter should [be construed as are pleadings in civil litigation] so as
to do substantial justice. '"20 A determination of whether substantial
rights were prejudiced by a deficiency is required. The court de-
clared that "prejudice is never presumed but it must affirmatively
appear that the error has affected a substantial right of the party
on the merits of the case."'" In examining whether prejudice had
occurred to Western Bank, the court found none and held that Rim-
rock's application was sufficient to give the board jurisdiction to
proceed with the hearing.Y
The second issue concerned the sufficiency of evidence in the
record to support the board's decision to grant the certificate of
authorization. 23 Making no reference to its implied adoption of the
substantial evidence rule in Vita-Rich Dairy, 2 4 the court cited a civil
18. Id. at.., 570 P.2d at 1118.
19. Id. at -, 570 P.2d at 1117.
20. Id. at -, 570 P.2d at 1118.
21. Id., citing Conway v. Fabian, 108 Mont. 287, 323, 89 P.2d 1022, 1037 (1939).
22. Id.
23. Id. at -, 570 P.2d at 1120.
24. The substantial evidence rule is the most commonly adopted standard of review on
the question of sufficiency of the evidence. This standard represents a middle position be-
tween a prohibition against any review on questions of fact and de novo review. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 526-32, 535-44 (1972).
1979]
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case for damages 5 as authority for adopting the substantial evi-
dence rule as the standard of review in Western Bank. The court
merely stated that it "has repeatedly hld that. its function on ap-
peal is to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the
record to support the judgment.""6 In affirming the board's decision
the court found "the evidence presented amply fulfills each and
every one of the statutory and regulatory requirements for a new
bank. "27
The third issue raised in the case was based upon a challenge
to the legality of regulations adopted by the board." Western Bank
argued that the regulations were invalid because the board had
improperly rejected a petition requesting a public hearing upon the
proposed regulations. In a rather technical analysis, the court dis-
missed these contentions.29 While affirming the legality of the regu-
lations, the court noted that even if the challenge were meritorious,
inquiry was prohibited because the issue was raised only on appeal.3
In reaching the result, however, the court included dicta in the
opinion which could provide considerable support for denying hear-
ings on proposed rules for rather insubstantial reasons.3 1 Arguably,
this may defeat access to administrative decision-making, one of the
underlying goals of MAPA.
32
II. County of Blaine v. Moore
33
Blaine County sought judicial review of an order by the Depart-
ment of Social and Rehabilitative Services (SRS) that held the
county liable for payments to St. James Hospital on behalf of medi-
cally indigent residents. The order was appealed to and reversed by
the Board of Social and Rehabilitation Appeals. The decision of the
appeals board was, in turn, affirmed by the district court. On appeal
to the supreme court, Blaine County raised five issues for review .3
25. Strong v. Williams, 154 Mont. 65, 460 P.2d 90 (1969).
26. __ Mont. at - , 570 P.2d at 1120.




31. The court concluded that since the petition requesting a hearing on the proposed
regulations contained no allegation that the petitioners were "persons who will be directly
affected by the proposed rule..." as required by MCA § 2-4-302(4) (1978) (formerly codified
at R.C.M. 1947, § 82-4204(1)(b) (Supp. 1977)), the petition was insufficient.
32. MCA § 2-3-101 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 82-4226 (Supp. 1977))
states that legislative guidelines must be adopted to "secure to the people of Montana their
constitutional right to be afforded reasonable opportunity to participate in the operation of
governmental agencies prior to the final decision of the agency."
33. - Mont. -, 568 P.2d 1216 (1977).
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The outcome of each issue rested, essentially, on whether there were
sufficient facts in the record to support the judgment.35
From the beginning of the opinion, the court failed to acknowl-
edge the principles underlying limited judicial review which were
recognized in Vita-Rich Dairy.3" The words "substantial evidence"
do not appear in the opinion and the court mentions neither the
scope nor the standard of review. The court apparently proceeded
upon the assumption that it must determine the "correctness" of
the decision rather than determining that there was substantial
evidence to support the rulings on questions of fact and determining
whether questions of law were correctly decided.
The holding has little value as precedent except to SRS and to
counties. No important points of law are clarified. A simple affirma-
tion of the district court's judgment would have served as well.
III. Baker National Insurance Agency v. Department of Revenue3
7
A consolidated appeal was filed by several corporations which
each owned both an insurance company and a bank. The insurance
company-bank affiliates had made application to the Department
of Revenue to be allowed to file consolidated tax returns. The appli-
cations were denied and an appeal was brought before the State Tax
Appeal Board. The board affirmed the department's decision, hold-
ing first that the businesses did not qualify as "unitary" businesses
as required by statute, and second, that consolidated tax returns
could not be filed when the department, having the discretion to
determine when such returns are appropriate, had not granted its
permission to file. The district court affirmed the board's decision.
On appeal to the supreme court, the decision was again af-
firmed.Y The court confined its inquiry to a determination that the
record contained substantial evidence to support the judgment and
a finding that no abuse of discretion occurred. In its opinion, the
court at least tacitly acknowledged its function as a "watchdog" of
the administrative process."
35. Neither the county nor the court characterized the five issues presented for review
as issues of fact. All were questions of whether each entity which had made a determination
of liability had erred in that decision. The distinction between questions of fact and conclu-
sions of law is important in that the former should stand as found by the district court if
supported by substantial evidence and the latter are clearly within the exclusive province of
the court. For a general discussion of the distinction between questions of fact and law in
administrative cases see SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 587-88 (1976) and CoopER, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE CouRTs 339-41 (1951).
36. See text accompanying note 16, supra.
37. - Mont. -. , 571 P.2d 1156 (1977).
38. Id. at -, 571 P.2d at 1157.
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Two issues were presented on appeal; one was framed in a
manner appropriate to judicial review, while the other was not. The
issues were:
1. Whether the parent-subsidiary corporations are conducting a
unitary business as defined by [Montana Code Annotated (herein-
after MCA) § 15-31-141 (1978)].
2. Whether respondent has the discretionary authority to deter-
mine when consolidated returns are appropriate. 0
The first issue should have been whether there was substantial evi-
dence in the record to support the finding that appellants were not
operating a unitary business. The second issue was appropriately
stated since it asked the court to determine a question of law:
whether the agency had discretion to perform a particular act."
In resolving the first issue, the court applied the appropriate
test adopted in Western Bank:"2 "We, therefore, hold the record
contains substantial evidence to support the District Court's finding
that appellants were not conducting a unitary business operation."' 3
Expert testimony in the record established that the financial re-
cords of the two entities were not interdependent, a prerequisite
imposed by the statute."
The second issue required application of principles of statutory
construction. The statute allowing consolidated returns provides, in
part:
(1) Corporations which are affiliated may not file a consolidated
return unless at least 80% of all classes of stock of each corporation
involved is owned directly or indirectly by one or more members
of the affiliated group.
(2) Corporations may not file a consolidated return unless the oper-
ation of the affiliated group constitutes a unitary business and
permission to file a consolidated return is given by the state de-
partment of revenue. For purposes of this section, a "unitary busi-
ness operation" means one in which the business operations con-
ducted by the corporations in the affiliated group are interrelated
or interdependent to the extent that the net income of one corpora-
tion cannot reasonably be determined without reference to the
operations conducted by the other corporations. 5
The court concluded that the plain meaning of the statute was
"not readily gleaned from its language" and turned to an examina-
40. - Mont. at _ 571 P.2d at 1158.
41. See note 35, supra.
42. See text accompanying notes 17 to 32, supra.
43. - Mont. at __, 571 P.2d at 1160.
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tion of legislative history. The records of the House Ways and
Means Committee contained a statement that "under existing law
it is left entirely up to the State Board of Equalization [now the
Department of Revenue] whether to allow a corporation to file a
consolidated return."16 Therefore, the court held that the statute "is
permissive rather than mandatory and respondent did not abuse its
discretion in denying appellants' request for permission to file a
consolidated return.
'47
IV. The United States National Bank of Red Lodge v. Department
of Revenue48
A group of banks filed complaints in district court alleging the
Department of Revenue had illegally taxed United States obliga-
tions owned by the banks. The department filed motions to dismiss
based on the contention that the complaints involved a matter of
valuation for tax purposes, not an illegal tax. Since the banks had
not sought a hearing through administrative channels, the depart-
ment asserted that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies
deprived the court of jurisdiction.
The district court granted the motions and appeal was brought
from the dismissal. Ordinarily no appeal would lie from a district
court's dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies be-
cause the ruling is not one which falls within the statutory provi-
sions for judicial review under MAPA. Judicial review is available
only after a determination on the merits. MCA § 2-4-702 (1978)"'
provides that "a person who has exhausted all administrative
remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final
decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review . .. ,,11.1
MCA § 2-4-711 (1978)5 provides that "an aggrieved party may ob-
tain review of a final judgment of a district court. . . by appeal to
the Supreme Court ... .
A person whose complaint is dismissed because of a failure to
exhaust administrative remedies is not entitled to appellate review
because the dismissal is not a final judgment of the district court
on the merits of the case. In U.S. National Bank, however, an ap-
peal was allowed because the dismissal had the effect of a final
judgment. Plaintiffs could not recommence the administrative pro-
cess because the statute of limitations had run. The court cited a
46. __ Mont. at -, 571 P.2d at 1160.
47. Id.
48. - Mont. __, 573 P.2d 188 (1977).
49. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 82-4216 (Supp. 1977).
49.1. Emphasis added.
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civil case52 wherein the granting of a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon wh ich relief could be granted was held to be
appealable. The court said that "the practical effect of the district
court's order is to leave appellant without opportunity for further
judicial relief, just as if judgment had been rendered against him.
Therefore, the order. . . is properly before this Court on appeal."",
The court provided an exception to the exhaustion of remedies rule
and followed the rule of Larson v. State:"' "where the issue is illegal-
ity of a tax, as opposed to a valuation, the matter may be brought
directly before the courts."
The U.S. National Bank holding should not be read as an un-
qualified assertion that a plaintiff will be accorded judicial access
when administrative remedies are no longer available. Plaintiffs
asserted a claim that was not subject to administrative determina-
tion, the illegality of a tax. If plaintiffs had filed a complaint in
district court after the time specified for administrative review on
a matter that was clearly one on which an agency must make a final
decision, the court would certainly find the rule of this case inappl-
icable. In remanding, the court in U.S. National Bank pointed out
that it was not reaching the merits of the case and noted that "[i]t
is entirely possible the Department's interpretation of the facts may
later prove to be correct." 55 The court emphasized that "[iff in
subsequent proceedings the Department proves that this case in-
volves an issue of valuation rather than imposition of an illegal tax,
appellants would be barred from court for failure to first exhaust
their administrative remedies of appeal to the tax appeal
boards. . . ."" This statement should prevent attempts to use the
case as precedent for judicial access when administrative remedies
simply have not been pursued within the statutory period.
Another important factor contributed to the court's reversal of
the district court's ruling on the motions to dismiss. The court was
distressed by the fact that the defendant, Department of Revenue,
had succeeded in foreclosing the plaintiffs' case simply by asserting
that plaintiffs were wrong in charging that an illegal tax had been
levied. The court reiterated the rule that "the only relevant inquiry
in reviewing a District Court order granting a. . .motion to dismiss
is whether the complaint, standing alone, sets forth facts which, if
true, vest the District Court with subject matter jurisdiction." 5' In
52. Hasbrouck v. Krsul, 168 Mont. 270, 272, 541 P.2d 1197, 1198 (1975).
53. - Mont. at -, 573 P.2d at 190.
54. 166 Mont. 449, 456, 534 P.2d 854, 858 (1975).
55. - Mont. at -, 573 P.2d at 191.
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this case, plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient; nevertheless, defen-
dant's unsupported denials were allowed to prevail. The court sum-
marized its feeling with the statement that "the most troublesome
aspect here is that the defendant was permitted simply to say 'Nay'
upon affidavit and thereby prevent plaintiffs from having their day
in court.""
CONCLUSION
These cases provide some guidance to the court's perception of
its role in reviewing administrative orders. There are some indica-
tions that the court will adhere to the principles of deference to
administrative expertise, judicial economy, and due process which
were enunciated in Vita-Rich Dairy.5 Albeit indirectly, the court
appears to have adopted the substantial evidence rule which re-
quires affirmation of the agency's decision on questions of fact if the
record contains substantial evidence to support the decision. But
the County of Blaine case, where the court failed to distinguish
between questions of fact and law or to follow any of the guidelines
of Vita-Rich Dairy, indicates that the court may not have a clear
commitment to limited review of administrative law cases.
58. Id. at __, 573 P.2d at 191, citing Harrington v. Holiday Rambler Corp., 165 Mont.
32, 37, 525 P.2d 556, 559 (1974).
59. See text accompanying note 16, supra.
19791
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